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COMMENT
"YANKEE GO HOME"-CIVIL RIGHTS VOLUNTEER
ATTORNEYS AND THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW
Since the historic decision in Brown v. Board of Education,:
several Southern States have resisted enforcement of federal constitu-
tional and statutory directives concerning racial equality. The form of
resistance has ranged from direct confrontation with federal authority2
to more subtle attacks on civil rights organizations3 or their legal
representatives.4
The recent influx of volunteer attorneys from other parts of the
country has exposed the civil rights movement to a new method of
attack. Since few of the attorneys are members of the bar of the states
in which they operate, the prohibitions against the unauthorized prac-
tice of law can be used effectively to restrict their activities. With a
few notable exceptions,5 the volunteers were initially welcomed by the
Southerners;6 but several recent incidents indicate that animosity is
increasing. Threats of penal action have been made against leading
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 The most striking example of direct confrontation is the defiance in 1957 by
Arkansas Governor Faubus of a federal court order to integrate Little Rock Central High
School.
8 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The NAACP opened an Alabama
office without complying with the state statute requiring corporations to qualify before
doing business in the state. A restraining order was issued, and on the state's motion the
court ordered the production of the NAACP's membership list. The Supreme Court
held that such state action infringed the freedom of association.
4 The earliest attacks were in the form of special antisolicitation statutes aimed at
preventing organizations such as the NAACP from sponsoring civil rights litigation. This
practice was struck down on first and fourteenth amendment grounds in NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See generally Comment, The South's Amended Barratry
Laws: An Attempt To End Group Pressure Through the Courts, 72 YAIE L.J. 1613 (1963).
5 There were a few early instances of hostility on the part of the local bar. See
Sitton, Mississippi Is Said To Misapply Laws, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1964, at 53, col. 1,
reporting the successful attempt by two Mississippi attorneys to prevent a New York
attorney from representing a white civil rights worker in a Mississippi court. See also
Letter from attorney Ralph Shapiro to the Cornell Law Review, April 7, 1967 (on file
in the Cornell Law Library), describing a similar experience.
6 See Driesen, A Civil Rights Setback in Southern Courts, 36 THE REPORTER, Feb. 23,
1967, at 18.
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civil rights attorneys, 7 and a substantial number of state courts have
issued blanket prohibitions against practice by out-of-state attorneys
on a pro hac vice basis.8 A few federal judges have similar rules.9 State
bar associations have also taken action against civil rights volunteers.' 0
Designed originally to protect the public from incompetent legal
advice and services, the laws against unauthorized practice may become
a tool for depriving the Southern Negro community of legal repre-
sentation in civil rights cases. When combined with a vigorous assault
on local attorneys who regularly represent civil rights litigants,," an
exclusion of out-of-state volunteers could create a vacuum in which
Southern Negroes will be unable to assert their rights in court for
want of effective assistance of counsel.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The Volunteer Movement
The large-scale influx of volunteer attorneys into the South began
in the summer of 1964 with "Project Mississippi," sponsored by the
National Lawyers Guild.' 2 The purpose of the Guild project was ex-
plained by its president: "Our concern in the Mississippi Project is to
7 In November 1966 Donald A. Jelinek, former staff counsel of the Alabama office
of the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee (LCDC), was arrested for unauthorized
practice. Prior to his arrest, Jelinek had practiced in association with members of the
local bar for more than a year. His right to practice was challenged by a member of the
Alabama Bar. Jelinek has since left Alabama and the charges against him have been
dropped. Id.
In February 1967 Richard B. Sobol, staff counsel of LCDC's Louisiana office, was
arrested for unauthorized practice. Sobol had been practicing in association with the New
Orleans firm of Collins, Douglas & Elie and had been introduced to the court by Mr.
Collins as his associate. Amended complaint, Sobol v. Perez, Civil No. 67-243 (E.D. La.,
filed Feb. 27, 1967).
8 Brief for LCDC as Amicus Curiae at 4, Rowe v. Mississippi, Civil No. WC 676
(N.D. Miss., filed March 9, 1967). See also Driesen, supra note 6, at 19-20.
) 2 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HEARINGS 320 (1965).
10 In October 1966 a special committee of the Mississippi Bar Association was formed
to "investigate charges arising from legal matters involving people who might not be
licensed to practice law in Mississippi." Driesen, supra note 6, at 19.
11 In January 1967 Lackey Rowe, a Mississippi attorney and member of the Lawyer's
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, was jailed for contempt when he attempted to
discover why one of his clients was being arrested during a criminal proceeding in which
the client was a defendant. Rowe's appearance in court on the day of his arrest was on
behalf of 43 defendants in a civil-rights-oriented criminal prosecution. The judge who
ordered Rowe jailed had a blanket rule against appearances by out-of-state attorneys.
There is no record whether these defendants were able to obtain counsel for their defense
after Rowe was jailed. Brief for LCDC as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, Rowe v. Mississippi, Civil
No. WC 676 (N.D. Miss., filed March 9, 1967).
12 NATIONAL LAwYERS GUELD, PROJECT MississSippi 2-3 (1964).
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attempt to redress the lack of available lawyers in Mississippi, ready,
willing and able to handle civil rights cases."' 3I
Two other groups were formed at the same time, and both are
continuing to provide volunteer assistance. The Lawyers Constitu-
tional Defense Committee (LCDC) began working with the Council of
Federated Organizations, a coalition of civil rights groups in Missis-
sippi, and has since expanded its activities to include staff offices in
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The Lawyer's Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law (President's Committee) began sending
volunteers to the South in 1964 and now has a full-time staff in Jack-
son, Mississippi, consisting of five attorneys assisted by three or four
different volunteers each month.
Most of the attorneys presently working with these groups are
not members of the local bar and usually practice in association with
the few locally licensed attorneys available for civil rights work. 14 The
other major group providing legal services to the civil rights movement,
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF), depends
almost entirely on local counsel and does not ordinarily encounter un-
authorized practice problems.15
The early work of the volunteer organizations centered on provid-
ing defense counsel for civil rights workers accused of crimes. Since
then their activity has expanded to include institution of affirmative
actions against state officials in the federal courts and representation of
Negroes in ordinary civil actions, both as plaintiffs and defendants.
Those who have participated in the volunteer program are convinced
that the groups have been and continue to be a valuable asset to the
civil rights movement.1 The presence of attorneys to explain and de-
fend constitutional rights has helped to restrain overt intimidation by
law enforcement officials 17 and has given the Southern Negro com-
munity a greater confidence in, and respect for, the law as a means of
achieving justice. 18
Is Id. at 3.
14 The purpose and activity of LCDC has been expressly approved by the American
Bar Association. Standing Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 786, Dec. 24,
1964.
15 Interview with LDF staff attorneys, New York City, March 31, 1967.
16 E.g., Honnold, The Bourgeois Bar and the Mississippi Movement, 52 A.B.A.J. 228
(1966). (Professor Honnold headed the Mississippi office of the President's Committee dur-
ing June 1965). Interview with Robert Lunney, President's Committee, New York City,
August 11, 1967.
17 Honnold, supra note 16.
18 Letter from Denison Ray, Chief Counsel for the President's Committee, to the
Cornell Law Review, March 24, 1967 (on file in the Cornell Law Library).
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The groups have not met with success on all fronts. One goal
was to promote greater participation in civil rights cases by local white
practitioners. Although there is some evidence of increased partici-
pation,19 most Southern white attorneys remain, for several reasons,
unwilling to take part in civil rights cases.20 Many of those who have
done civil rights work have suffered economic reprisals, 21 threats of
violence, social ostracism, and legal harassment. 22 Many Southern attor-
neys refuse to participate simply because they are unsympathetic to the
civil rights movement.23
The staggering burden of casework, therefore, rests almost entirely
on the shoulders of local Negro attorneys, not all of whom do civil rights
work, and on the staff members and volunteers of the civil rights
groups.24 Keeping volunteers out of the South will continue to restrict
the peaceful progress of the civil rights movement; if Southern Negroes
are left without representation to pursue their rights legally, their only
alternative is self-help.
B. Unauthorized Practice
Since most attorneys engaged in civil rights work in the South
are nonresidents and are not licensed to practice in the Southern
19 Doyle, Southern Justice, 37 Miss. L.J. 428, 441-43 (1966).
20 Honnold, supra note 16, at 231. In 1963 the United States Civil Rights Commis-
sion conducted a questionnaire survey of 3,555 lawyers in Southern and Border States.
Although only 37.2% of those questioned responded, the results illustrate the limited
number of lawyers who participate in civil rights cases. Of those responding, only 14%
had represented Negroes in civil rights cases in the last eight years, a third of whom
reported "threats of physical violence, loss of clients, or social ostracism as a result."
Twenty per cent of the respondents were Negro. 1963 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 117-19.
21 Honnold, supra note 16, at 232, reports the case of Warren Fortson, presently a
President's Committee staff attorney, whose own practice was "destroyed by his stand
on civil rights."
22 Carter, A Lawyer Leaves Mississippi, 28 THE REPRTER, May 9, 1963, at 33, dis-
cusses the story of William Higgs, who left Mississippi after a period of harassment cul-
minating in a criminal prosecution in which he was convicted, in absentia, of contrib-
uting to the delinquency of a minor. Higgs's departure left "only one white lawyer who
regularly handles civil rights cases . . . in all twelve Southern states ... ." .d.
23 Complaint is also voiced that our lawyers do not view the efforts of the civil
rights workers "sympathetically." To that indictment, we plead guilty. We view
those efforts as harmful, as destructive of good racial relations, and as an intol-
erable intrusion into our affairs by a group which has no real concern for the
welfare of our community.
Luckett, Clarksdale Customs, 37 Miss. L.J. 419, 425 (1966).
24 C. B. King, a Negro attorney in Georgia, had over 2,000 civil rights cases pending
during 1964. Pollitt, Timid Lawyers and Neglected Clients, 229 HARPER'S, Aug. 1964, at
81, 83. The LCDC Docket for October 1966 shows over 400 cases involving more than 2,000
plaintiffs and defendants. In 1965 there were only 4 Negro attorneys in the entire state
of Mississippi. 2 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HEARINGS 321 (1965).
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States, the prohibition against unauthorized practice of law 25 furnishes
a tool for the states to restrict the volunteers' activities.
1. "Practice of Law"
Volunteer attorneys are not subject to sanctions for unauthorized
practice unless their activity constitutes the practice of law. Though the
term is not easily defined,26 "practice of law" generally includes all the
uniquely professional activities of a qualified, licensed attorney. 27 To
determine whether any particular activity constitutes the practice of
law, resort must be had to the particular jurisdiction's case law.
Certain activities of the volunteer attorneys may fall outside the
definition. A leading Louisiana case, for example, supports the theory
that mere investigation does not constitute the practice of law.28 Though
the line between investigation and legal advice is a fine one, ferreting
out facts, interviewing witnesses, and generally marshalling evidence
should not, under this theory, subject the volunteer attorney to charges
of unauthorized practice.29
Many jurisdictions do not proscribe services performed gratui-
tously. In an advisory opinion to the legislature, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court stated that "[t]he gratuitous furnishing of
legal aid to the poor and unfortunate without means in the pursuit
of any civil remedy, as a matter of charity, [does] .. .not constitute
the practice of law. "80 Though the principle is not universally ac-
cepted,31 many state legislatures, including those of Alabama,3 2 Lou-
25 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 31 (1958); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:213 (1964); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 8682 (1956).
26 Cowem v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 646, 290 N.W. 795, 797 (1940) ("The line between
what is and what is not the practice of law cannot be drawn with precision.'), See also
State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Ass'n v. Indiana Real Estate Ass'n, 244 Ind. 214, 191
N.E.2d 711 (1963); Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 183, 52 N.E.2d 27, 32 (1943);
State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 94, 295 N.W. 381, 383 (1941).
27 State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1
(1961), supplemented, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Auto-
mobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139 (1935); see In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust
Co., 49 Idaho 280, 286, 288 P. 157, 159 (1930).
28 Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. App. 1936) (dictum). The court found that
the defendant's activity exceeded mere investigation.
29 Cf. State v. Woodville, 161 La. 125, 108 So. 309 (1926).
30 Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 289 Mass. 607, 615, 194 N.E. 313, 317-18
(1935); accord, State v. Adair, 34 Del. 585, 586, 156 A. 358, 359 (1922) (test is whether the
services were performed for a "fee or reward').
31 State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961),
supplemented, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962), held that reliance by a client is more
important than the question of compensation. Referring to the "fee or reward" theory,
one court asserted: "It might as well be said that a surgeon who performs, without fee
1967]
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isiana, 83 and Mississippi,84 have partially adopted it. The statutes
typically distinguish between in-court services and out-of-court ad-
vice, applying the fee or reward proviso only to the latter; any court
appearance constitutes the practice of law.35
2. Temporary Admission to the Bar
The simplest and most obvious method of avoiding sanctions for
unauthorized practice is for the volunteer attorney to gain admission
to the bar of the state in which he operates. Staff attorneys may seek
permanent admission.3 6 But since most volunteers are in the South for
a very short period, their only practical alternative is to seek pro hac
vice admissions on a case-by-case basis.37
All Southern States allow nonresident attorneys to practice in a
particular case upon satisfaction of certain conditions. The pro hac
vice admission is a matter of privilege, not of right,38 and the court is
or reward, a tonsilectomy or appendectomy is not practicing surgery." State ex rel. Wright
v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 297, 268 N.W. 95, 96 (1936).
32 ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 42 (1958).
33 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:212 (1964).
34 Miss. CODE ANN. § 8682 (1956).
35 The courts have inherent power to regulate the practice of law. Although legisla-
tures may enact statutes assisting the courts, they may not restrict the courts' power.
Liebtag v. Dilworth, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 221 (C.P. 1962) (holding that statutes which
purport to authorize a lay person to engage in the practice of law are invalid, since
the power to define the practice of law is in the judiciary and not in the legislature).
Grievance Comm. v. Coryell, 190 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Grievance Comm.
v. Dean, 190 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). See also Arizona State Bar v. Arizona Land
Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961), supplemented, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d
1020 (1962); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139
(1935); Appeal of Cichon, 227 Wis. 62, 278 N.W. 1 (1938). Thus, even where a state
legislature has excluded gratuitous out-of-court advice from the statutory prohibition, the
courts may impose broader restrictions on civil rights volunteers. When asked to enjoin
the volunteer's activity, for instance, the court will not be bound by legislative definitions.
Darby v. Board of Bar Admissions, 185 So. 2d 684 (Miss. 1966) (dictum). The legislative
definition will, however, take on importance when penal sanctions are imposed, since
courts may not define new crimes not provided for in the statute. Washington State Bar
Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash. 2d 697, 251 P.2d 619 (1952). See also
Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. App. 1936).
36 For example, Marian Wright, staff attorney for LDF in Mississippi, was recently
admitted to the bar of that state. Interview with LDF staff attorneys in New York City,
March 31, 1967.
37 The custom of granting pro hac vice admissions was recognized in England as
early as 1629 in Thursby v. Warren, 79 Eng. Rep. 738 (C.P. 1629). The practice was ac-
cepted in the United States by 1876. In re Mosness, 39 Wis. 509 (1876); see 1 E. THORN-
TON, ArroRNEys AT LAW 22 (1914).
38 See Miss. CODE ANN. § 8666 (1956), which provides in part: "It is hereby declared
to be the public policy of the State of Mississippi that the practice of law before any
court or administrative agency is a matter of privilege and not a matter of right."
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vested with broad discretion to grant or deny admission. Statutes re-
lating to pro hac vice admissions are generally permissive rather than
mandatory.39 Even a statute mandatory on its face40 would not ab-
solutely bind the courts, which have the inherent power to regulate
admission to practice.41
Louisiana and Mississippi have statutory provisions for pro hac
vice admissions. In Louisiana, a nonresident attorney may practice in
association with a Louisiana attorney or may practice alone after re-
ceiving a pro hac vice admission from the court in which he wishes
to appear.42 Admission is conditioned upon the presentation of satis-
factory evidence that the state in which the attorney is licensed would
allow a Louisiana attorney to practice alone.43 Until the judge issues
an order admitting the applicant, no papers may be filed on which he
appears as the attorney of record.44
Mississippi provides for pro hac vice admission of nonresidents
who are in good professional standing and of good character, and who
are familiar with the ethics, practices, and customs of the Mississippi
Bar. The nonresident must subject himself to the jurisdiction of the
State Board of Bar Admissions. Two Mississippi attorneys, not of the
same firm, may question the attorney's membership in, or financial
contributions to, any organization during the five years immediately
preceding the investigation, and may challenge his right to practice. 45
Alabama has no reference to pro hac vice admissions either in its
statutes or supreme court rules. Jurisdiction over admissions is vested
in the supreme court, and the rules of the state bar provide that a
nonresident attorney may be permitted to appear in a particular case
after obtaining an introduction and recommendation from a member
of the Board of Commissioners of the state bar.46
Application for temporary admission may often be a fruitless
venture, however, since many local judges have blanket rules against
pro hac vice admissions. If temporary admission is impossible, the
volunteer must either run the risk of criminal prosecution or stop
S9 See, e.g., MISS. CoDE ANN. § 8666 (1956).
40 LA. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 37:215 (1964) provides that the court "shall" admit attorneys
who meet the statutory requirements.
41 See note 35 supra.
42 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:214 (1964).
43 Id. § 37:215. The fundamental requirement, of course, is that the applicant be an
attorney at law. State v. Henry, 196 La. 218, 198 So. 910 (1940).
44 LA. RE v. STAT. ANN. § 37:216 (1964).
45 Miss. CODE ANN. § 8666 (1956). See note 5 supra.
46 4 MARTiNDALE-HuBB EL LAw D ECroRy 7 (1967).
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practicing in the South. Threatened with prosecution, LCDC attorney
Richard B. Sobol recently chose a third alternative. Joining two of his
clients as plaintiffs, he challenged the constitutionality of the prosecu-
tion, petitioning the federal district court to enjoin the threatened
activity.47 To succeed, Sobol must establish first, that the state action
violates constitutional rights and second, that federal injunctive relief
is appropriate.
II
THE INDIVIDUAL V. THE STATE: CONFLICT OF RIGHTS AND POWERS
In challenging a court's denial of pro hac vice admission or a
criminal charge of unauthorized practice, the civil rights attorney
probably cannot depend on an assertion of his own constitutional
rights.48 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners49 makes its clear that a
state may not constitutionally refuse permanent admission to the bar
in an arbitrary or capricious fashion. But since it may be impossible
for a court to ascertain the qualifications of an attorney requesting only
temporary admission, the Schware principles may not apply to pro hac
vice admissions. Since local attorneys are generally unavailable for civil
rights cases, however, the civil rights volunteer may be able to advance
the rights of his clients as a limit on the state's discretionary power to
restrict his activities. Such a limitation could be based upon one of four
distinct constitutional theories.
A. First Amendment
The first amendment rights of potential litigants provide the most
significant limitation on the state's power to restrict the practice of
the volunteer attorneys. In NAACP v. Button,50 the Supreme Court
recognized for the first time that civil rights litigation is a "form of
47 Sobol v. Perez, Civil No. 67-243 (E.D. La., filed Feb. 27, 1967). The heaing for in-
junctive relief is expected to take place in the fall of 1967 before a three-judge panel.
An amicus curiae brief is being prepared by several prominent law firms in support of
Sobol's position. Interview with Robert Lunney, President's Committee, New York City,
August 29, 1967.
48 There is no constitutional right to practice law. In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116
(1893); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872); Saier v. State Bar, 293 F.2d 756
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 947 (1961); Application of Levy, 214 F.2d 331 (5th Cir.
1954); Keeley v. Evans, 271 F. 520 (D. Ore.), appeal dismissed, 257 U.S. 667 (1921); Moity
v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 239 La. 1081, 121 So. 2d 87 (1960); In re Peters, 250 N.Y.
595, 166 N.E. 337 (1929).
49 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Although the state may require high standards for admission
to the bar, the prescribed qualifications must have a rational connection to the applicant's
fitness to practice. Id. at 239.
50 871 U.S. 415 (1963).
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political expression," 5' and thus falls within the protection of the first
amendment. 52
The right to litigate is meaningless without the effective assistance
of counsel.5 3 Since local counsel are generally unavailable for civil
rights cases, out-of-state attorneys are often the only source of legal
assistance.5 4 Thus, when a state prevents these volunteers from prac-
ticing, it effectively deprives the Negro of access to the courts. Such
deprivation of essential rights is valid only if the state can demonstrate
that "substantive evils" 55 flow from the activities of the volunteers.
One year after Button, the Court again employed the first amend-
ment to limit state regulation of attorneys. In Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen v. Virginia,56 the Court relied more heavily on free-
dom of association than on freedom of expression, implying that a
citizen has not only the right to litigate but also the right to associate
for that purpose. Arguably, each Southern Negro is "associated" with
the individual plaintiff in each civil rights case; 57 when one litigant
successfully establishes his rights in court, the fruits of his victory are
shared by all. To frustrate the individual's attempt to litigate by deny-
ing him an attorney is to render meaningless the Southern Negro com-
munity's right to association.
B. Right to Counsel of One's Choice
In Powell v. Alabama,58 the Supreme Court stated:
If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbi-
trarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and
appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such
a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due
process in the constitutional sense.59
Since the Powell case, the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed
this principle in appeals from both federal and state courts.60 The
51 Id. at 429.
52 Id.
53 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 68-69 (1932).
54 See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 170 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
385 U.S. 987 (1966).
55 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963).
56 377 US. 1 (1964).
57 Many civil rights cases are class actions. Furthermore, the attorneys themselves are
members of associations dedicated to advancing civil rights through court action.
58 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
59 Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
60 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958) (dictum) (overruled on another
1967]
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decisions have made it clear that the right to counsel of one's choice
includes not only fair opportunity and reasonable time to employ
such counsel, but a guarantee that the chosen attorney have sufficient
time to prepare the case.61 In reviewing denials of pro hac vice admis-
sions to out-of-state counsel chosen by the litigant, however, courts
have reached inconsistent results.
In United States v. Bergamo,62 the Third Circuit reversed a lower
court's denial of -pro hac vice admission to an out-of-state attorney
attempting to appear for the defendant in a criminal action. 63 A sub-
sequent decision by a federal district court in New York,64 however,
upheld such a denial, approving the state court's statement that
"counsel of his own choosing means counsel recognized by the courts
of this state." 65
Most cases brought by the volunteer attorneys are civil actions.66
If, as suggested in Bergamo, the right to counsel of one's choice is
based on the sixth amendment, it would not apply to civil litigants. 67
But in light of the concept's original formulation as a due process
guarantee, the distinction between civil and criminal cases is probably
unjustified.68
point by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9'
(1954); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
61 United States v. Mitchell, 354 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Johnston,
318 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1963).
62 154 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1946).
63 The trial judge had promulgated a blanket rule excluding out-of-state counsel.
The Third Circuit stated that "[t]o hold that defendants in a criminal trial may not be
defended by out-of-the-district counsel selected by them is to vitiate the guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 35. The court explicitly reserved the question whether this
right extends to civil cases. In striking down the rule the court ignored a more limited
basis for decision. The trial court had subsequently refused to grant local counsel's re-
quest for a continuance to prepare for the trial.
64 New York v. Epton, 248 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
65 Id. at 277. The problem implicit in applying Epton in the present context is that
counsel recognized by the state may not provide effective assistance because they are un-
willing to raise constitutional issues. See United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263
F.2d 71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 850 (1959), where the Fifth Circuit stated:
As Judges of a Circuit comprising six states of the deep South, we think that it
is our duty to take judicial notice that lawyers residing in many southern juris-
dictions rarely, almost to the point of never, raise the issue of systematic exclu-
sion of Negroes from juries.
Id. at 82.
66 See Doyle, Southern Justice, 37 Miss. L.J. 428, 443 (1966). The author states that
approximately 80% of civil rights litigation is civil rather than criminal and usually
affirmative in nature.
67 See note 63 supra.
68 See p. 125 supra.
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C. Privileges and Immunities
The privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment may, under certain circumstances, protect a citizen's right to
counsel of his choice, even if the attorney is not licensed in the particu-
lar jurisdiction. A recent Second Circuit case, Spanos v. Skouras
Theatres Corp.,69 held that a state may not constitutionally prohibit a
citizen with a federal claim or defense from engaging an out-of-state
attorney to assist and advise local counsel. The case expressly reserved
the question whether the privilege extends to having the out-of-state
attorney appear in court.70 To be of real value in civil rights cases, of
course, the privilege must be expanded to include court appearances.
Since local counsel are usually unavailable, mere advice will only in-
crease the Negro's resentment towards the false promises of the tradi-
tional machinery of justice. Denied legal means of redressing grievances,
the Negro community is likely to rebel against the established order
and use force where peaceful means have failed.
The solution to the problem left unresolved by Spanos is sug-
gested by Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg.7 1 The Fifth Circuit there
indicated that the absence of available local counsel limits the courts'
traditional discretion to grant or deny pro hac vice admissions and to
prescribe rules governing the conduct of out-of-state attorneys. Re-
ferring to a district court's rule that local counsel must be associated
with all litigation, the court stated that "if no local counsel are avail-
able, a court rule requiring local counsel should be waived." 72 Lefton
was cited with approval in Spanos, where the court noted that "in in-
stances where the federal claim or defense is unpopular, advice and
assistance by an out-of-state lawyer may be the only means available for
vindication." 73
A further difficulty is presented by the Spanos court's statement
that "we in no way sanction a practice whereby a lawyer not admitted
to practice by a state maintains an office there and holds himself out
to give advice to all comers on federal matters."74 This suggests that
an out-of-state attorney must be asked to participate in a specific case
before he may practice in the state. Such a restriction in civil rights
cases would render the volunteer groups impotent. Since the civil
69 864 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966).
70 Id. at 170-71.
71 333 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964).
72 Id. at 285.
73 364 F.2d at 170.
74 Id. at 171.
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rights attorneys operate without accepting fees, however, the language
of Spanos may not apply. The case in which Spanos assisted was an anti-
trust suit, and the principal litigation was an action to collect over
$89,000 in legal fees. The distinction between private commercial cases
and cases where the object of suit is not personal gain was recognized
in Lefton, and in NAACP v. Button76 the Supreme Court regarded
the services rendered in civil rights cases as less likely to create regula-
tory problems than "the use of the legal process for purely private
gain."77
D. Equal Protection
In Griffin v. Illinois7 8 and Douglas v. California,79 the Supreme
Court struck down laws which, though reasonable on their face and
impartially enforced, in practice worked a de facto discrimination
against the poor. Rules of court that, in operation, curtail the civil
rights of a racial group are similarly open to question, especially when
there is evidence that the purpose of the rule is to impede the enforce-
ment of civil rights rather than to protect a substantial regulatory
interest.80 The practical effect of a blanket rule against pro hac vice
admissions is to deny representation in the courts to Southern Negroes
who are unable to obtain local counsel. Although the white litigant
is similarly restricted in obtaining outside counsel, he is able to obtain
local counsel.
E. State Regulatory Interest
The state, of course, has a legitimate interest in maintaining high
standards of professional integrity and competence. A primary concern
is that the out-of-state attorney may be unfamiliar with the state law,
especially local procedural rules. Although some out-of-state attorneys
may be familiar with local law, the state may defend a blanket re-
striction as the only practical means of excluding the incompetent. It
is impractical to examine every applicant thoroughly to determine his
75 333 F.2d at 287.
76 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
77 Id. at 443.
78 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Illinois law required a certified bill of exceptions for appellate
review. A stenographic transcript of the trial proceedings was usually necessary and was
furnished free only to indigents sentenced to death.
7T 372 U.S. 353 (1963). A California rule of criminal procedure allowed the intermedi-
ate court of appeals to determine whether an indigent defendant should be assisted by
counsel on his appeal by right.
50 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445-46 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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individual qualifications for a pro hac vice admission. Although close
association with local counsel would alleviate the problem to some
extent, the civil rights attorney may be unable to find local counsel
with whom to associate, especially in rural areas.
Counterbalancing the argument that out-of-state attorneys should
be excluded for lack of knowledge is the recognized success such at-
torneys have had in Southern courts. The volunteers are specially
trained for this work before they enter the South, and many of the
volunteers are among the recognized intellectual leaders of the Amer-
ican bar. It is quite possible that the skill of the volunteers and their
consequent success in the courts are the real motivating factors be-
hind the current move to exclude them from practice.
Another justification for excluding the volunteers is that out-of-
state attorneys are not as thoroughly regulated as members of the local
bar. Although the volunteers will be subject to the courts' disciplinary
powers, the day-to-day regulation of practice by local custom, enforced
primarily by the need for a good professional reputation, is not as
readily applicable to the transient as to the local practitioner who
depends on his professional standing for his livelihood.
The state may also be legitimately concerned that attorneys will
come into the state for a month or two, initiate a number of lawsuits
and then exit, leaving the unfinished business to another lawyer who
may be unavailable or unprepared. But, since the volunteer groups now
have permanent offices and resident staff members in the South, there
is some continuity of representation. Furthermore, membership in the
bar of another state should provide strong evidence of professional
integrity. The attorneys should be accorded the presumption that their
conduct will comply with acceptable ethical standards.
F. A Possible Judicial Solution
A reasonable compromise between the state regulatory interest
and the constitutional rights of litigants might be reached by limiting
judicial discretion. The courts, of course, should have the power to
deny pro hac vice admission to an attorney who is disreputable or
incompetent. But if there is evidence that the litigant is unable to
obtain local counsel, the court should be required to demonstrate that
the attorney is not qualified. A rule that the court must state the
reasons for a denial of pro hac vice admission would provide a check
on arbitrary action and furnish the applicant with grounds upon which





Protracted litigation and appeal through the state court system,
possibly with ultimate recourse to the United States Supreme Court,
is an unsatisfactory way for an attorney to protect the constitutional
rights of all the parties involved in an unauthorized practice case.
During the entire course of such a proceeding, the attorney involved
will be unable to practice law, and his clients may well go without
representation. Effective relief must be swift. The most effective form of
relief is a federal court order enjoining the unlawful infringement of
constitutional rights.
A. Federal Jurisdiction
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides a cause of action at law
or in equity against anyone who, under color of state law, "subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws....
The Judiciary Act endows the federal courts with original jurisdiction
in such cases. 82
Jurisdiction has never been successfully invoked under these
statutes in cases alleging deprivation of the right to practice law,
8 3
since the Constitution does not protect that right.84 When civil rights
volunteers are prevented from practicing in the South, however, the
issue is much broader than a mere denial of the right to practice law.
Official actions in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi constitute
serious infringements of rights secured by the first and sixth amend-
ments and the privileges and limmunities, due process, and equal pro-
tection clauses of the Constitution. The federal courts clearly have
81 REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
82 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964) (jurisdiction over any action brought "to recover damages
or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the pro-
tection of civil rights . . .
83 For cases refusing to invoke the jurisdiction, see Mitchell v. Greenough, 100 F.2d
184 (9th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 659 (1939); Nicklaus v. Simmons, 196 F. Supp.
691 (D. Neb. 1961); Emmons v. Smitt, 58 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Mich. 1944), affd, 149 F.2d
869 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 746 (1945).
84 In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1893); Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1872). The federal courts may not require the state to grant a license to practice, Keeley
v. Evans, 271 F. 520 (D. Ore.), appeal dismissed, 257 U.S. 667 (1921), and lower federal
courts have no jurisdiction over state disciplinary proceedings. Green v. Elbert, 63 F.
308 (8th Cir. 1894). (The holding in Green was qualified because the plaintiff's right to
practice in federal courts was not affected by the state disbarment.)
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jurisdiction over actions brought to enforce and defend these basic
freedoms.8 5
Federal jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act is not dependent
on the lack of available state relief,8 6 and relief under state law need
not be sought firstA7 Alleging facts that constitute a deprivation of
constitutional rights under color of state law is sufficient to state a
cause of action.88 Jurisdiction is not dependent on the amount in
controversy,8 9 since the rights protected are "inherently incapable of
pecuniary valuation."90
B. "Equitable Jurisdiction"
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1871 empowers the federal
courts to entertain a suit in equity, "the statute does not extend the
sphere of equitable jurisdiction in respect of what shall be held an
appropriate subject matter for that kind of relief."'91 The traditional
rules of equity which must therefore apply relate not to "jurisdiction"
in the sense of the power to hear and determine a case, but to the
propriety of granting equitable relief in a case over which the court
has jurisdiction 92
The traditional prerequisite to granting equitable relief is the
inadequacy of a remedy at law. The doctrine requires that, to deprive
the court of equity jurisdiction, the remedy at law "must be as com-
plete, practical and efficient as that which equity could afford."93 Argu-
ably, one seeking to enjoin a state criminal prosecution has an
85 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (first amendment); Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908) (equal protection); Murphy v. Love, 249 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958) (due process); Livingston v. McLeod, 209 F. Supp. 605
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) (due process); New Am. Library of World Lit., Inc. v. Allen, 114 F. Supp.
823 (N.D. Ohio 1953) (due process); Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.W. Va.
1948) (equal protection); Sellers v. Johnson, 69 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Iowa 1946) (first
amendment, due process, equal protection); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Coe, 96 F.2d 518
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 604 (1938) (dictum); Baltimore Transit Co. v. Flynn, 50 F.
Supp. 382 (D. Md. 1943) (dictum).
86 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
87 McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Florida Lime & Avacado Growers,
Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960); Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963).
88 McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Florida Lime & Avacado Growers,
Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960); Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963).
89 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
90 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 530 (1939).
91 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903); Wolfe v. City of Albany, 189 F. Supp.
217 (D. Ga. 1960).
92 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Wolfe v. City of Albany, 189 F. Supp. 217
(D. Ga. 1960).
93 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923).
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adequate remedy at law, since he may assert both factual94 and consti-
tutional95 defenses. In at least one situation, however, the legal remedy
is inadequate despite the accused's ability to assert a constitutional
defense. If first amendment rights are involved, prosecution itself is
an impairment of those rights.9 6 Thus, when a state prosecutes an
attorney for unauthorized practice, the client's first amendment right
to litigate may be infringed. 7 In such a case, the attorney may seek
to enjoin his own prosecution by asserting the rights of his client,98
or the client may assert his own rights to enjoin the prosecution of his
attorney.99
In addition to first amendment rights, the client has other rights
that may be infringed by prosecution of his attorney, The attorney's
assertion of those rights in his own defense would not constitute an
adequate legal remedy for the client, because the client would not be
a party to the action. Since the client would have no other legal means
to assert or defend his rights, federal injunctive relief should be avail-
able to him.10 0
C. Abstention and the Anti-Injunction Statute
In the famous case of Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman
Co.,1 10 Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, directed the fed-
94 In the Sobol case, for example, the plaintiff might, in the criminal prosecution,
show factual compliance with state law. See note 103 infra.
95 The ability to assert constitutional defenses at trial constitutes an adequate legal
remedy. Porto Rico Tel. Co. v. Puerto Rico Communications Auth., 189 F.2d 39 (lst Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951).
96 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), holding that, where state criminal
statutes create a danger to free expression, the district court must enjoin state officials
from enforcing the statutes. The Court reasoned that even a good-faith prosecution
would have such a "chilling effect" on freedom of expression that only a federal injunc-
tion would effectively protect the rights of the accused. A fortiori, when a prosecution
is brought not in good faith, but primarily to harass and intimidate the accused, the
need for injunctive relief is dear. Cox v. Louisiana, 848 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1965).
97 See pp. 124-25 supra.
98 Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). The Supreme Court held that a state
court's action in enforcing a racially restrictive covenant violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Defendants in the suit were whites who had agreed
to sell to Negroes in violation of the covenant. They were allowed to assert the rights
of the Negro purchasers in defense. See also Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S.
301 (1965).
99 In Sobol v. Perez, Civil No. 67-243 (E.D. La., filed Feb. 27, 1967), two clients joined
with attorney Sobol seeking to enjoin the threatened prosecution.
100 See Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 826 U.S. 620 (1946), where the
Court said that a district court may enjoin a state court proceeding that cannot ade-
quately protect the petitioner's constitutional rights.
'101 312 U.S. 496 (1641). See also Harrison v. NAACP, 860 US. 167, 176 (1959); AFL
v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 595-96 (1946).
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eral judiciary to avoid "needless friction with state policies"102 by
refusing to hear cases which could be decided under state law. If the
"Pullman doctrine" were applied to the Sobol case, for example, the
district court might deny the injunction on the grounds that the case
could be resolved by a finding that Sobol had complied with state
law.103 The doctrine, however, is inapplicable when a plaintiff alleges
grave and irreparable injury to constitutionally protected rights.10
Dombrowski v. Pfister0 r clearly indicates that criminal prosecu-
tions that threaten first amendment rights constitute grave and ir-
reparable injury, and the opinion suggests that the district court has
no discretion to deny an injunction in such a case. The Fifth Circuit
has even more clearly narrowed the trial court's discretion. In Cox v.
Louisiana,08 the court acknowledged the general validity of the ab-
stention doctrine, but said:
When a State, under the pretext of preserving law and order uses
local laws, valid on their face, to harass and punish citizens for the
exercise of their constitutional rights or federally protected statu-
tory rights, the general principle must yield to the excep-
tion .... 107
Similarly, in Woods v. Wright,10 the court stated that "[w]here there
is a clear and imminent threat of an irreparable injury amounting to
manifest oppression it is the duty of the court to protect against the
loss of the asserted right .... 109
The philosophy of the abstention doctrine is embodied in a fed-
eral anti-injunction statute which provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments."10
Since the statute does not apply until proceedings are actually pend-
ing in the state court, it does not bar relief where, as in the Sobol case,
102 312 U.S. at 500.
103 Sobol alleges that he practiced in association with the New Oreleans firm of
Collins, Douglas & Elie. Louisiana law permits an out-of-state attorney to practice in
association with local counsel, but "association" is not defined. LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 37-214 (1964). A finding that Sobol had "associated" with local counsel would remove the
need for decision of the constitutional issues.
104 Browder v. Gale, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.) (three-judge panel), aff'd per
curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). See also Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1958).
105 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
106 348 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1965).
107 Id. at 752.
108 334 F.2d 369 (6th Cir. 1964).
109 Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
110 Act of June 25, 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
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the injunction is requested prior to the filing of an information."'
Once a criminal prosecution is pending, however, an injunction can
issue only if the case comes under one of the exceptions.
Arguably, Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, provid-
ing for "an action at law [or a] suit in equity," 12 expressly authorizes
such relief. The courts, however, are divided on the effect of the sec-
tion,"3 the most recent case holding that the section is not a statutory
exception." 4 The Supreme Court has reserved decision on the issue.",5
It is reasonable to interpret section 1983 as an express statutory
authorization of injunctions. The contrary interpretation would imply
that Congress intended the federal courts to have equity powers in
civil rights cases but deprived them of the most effective tool of equity,
the injunction. Furthermore, such an interpretation would condition
the availability of injunctive relief on the outcome of a race between
the prosecutor and the accused. The realities of the situation should
overcome such nice distinctions.
Even if section 1983 is not an express exception to the anti-
injunction statute, injunctive relief may be awarded on the theory
that the statute merely codifies the abstention doctrine and is there-
fore subject to the irreparable injury exception. In Baines v. City of
Danville,"6 which held that section 1983 was not an express exception,
the court said:
Since the statute was fathered by the principles of comity, it has
been held that the statute should be read in the light of those
principles and, though absolute in its terms, is inapplicable in
extraordinary cases in which an injunction against state court
proceedings is the only means of avoiding grave and irreparable
injury.... [W]e have certainly been told by the Supreme Court
that in those circumstances it may be disregarded, for its parentage
discloses that it was not intended to be as absolute as it sounds." 7
When state action preventing nonresident attorneys from prac-
ticing works a denial of the Negro's first amendment right to litigate,
the Dombrowski principle clearly justifies a federal injunction against
state officials.
Ill Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
112 REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) (emphasis added).
113 Compare Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 939 (1965) (§ 1983 held not a statutory exception), with Cooper v. Hutchinson,
184 F.2d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 1950) (§ 1983 held an exception).
114 Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F. Supp. 878 (S.D. Miss. 1966) (three-judge panel).
115 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 880 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965).
116 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1965).
117 Id. at 593. " "
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CONCLUSION
Richard B. Sobol's injunction suit in a federal district court will
challenge the constitutionality of Louisiana's threatened prosecution
for unauthorized practice. Of the several constitutional theories avail-
able to Sobol, the clearest and strongest is based on the violation of
the first amendment rights of Southern Negroes that will result if he
and others similarly situated are denied the right to practice law in
the South.
In the past, Southern regulatory statutes attempting to thwart the
civil rights movement by harassing its legal representatives have fallen
before constitutional attacks in the Supreme Court. There is no reason
to assume that the most recent method of harassment will be any more
successful.
Mark H. Dadd
John A. Lowe
